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INTRODUCTION 
The tax treatment of foreign-source income of U.S. oil companies 
is under a multi-faceted attack which arises largely from a number of 
serious misconceptions. For example, critics of present tax policy argue 
erroneously that it: 
1. Encourages American companies to explore abroad rather than at 
home and hence is contrary to the national interest. 
Actually, U.S. tax treatment of foreign petroleum exploration and 
production closely parallels domestic taxation. A notable exception is 
that percentage depletion is valueless in many foreign cases because the 
foreign tax is higher than the U.S. tax would be without depletion. 
Furthermore, the investment credit on tangible personal property is 
largely inapplicable to foreign operations. In no case does an operator 
pay a lower total tax (domestic plus foreign) than he would pay on a 
similar operation in the United States. 
Some critics who understand that foreign and domestic tax treat-
ments are parallel are now contending that foreign petroleum tax treat-
ment should be deliberately amended-in the name of the national 
interest-to make foreign exploration less attractive. Their goal is to 
bring American explorers home to search for secure domestic supplies. 
In fact, one cannot encourage domestic exploration by making foreign 
exploration less attractive. Domestic exploration must be made more 
attractive. It is no more than a half truth to say that American compa-
nies have gone abroad because foreign exploration has been more profit-
able than domestic. Oil is sought wherever a geologically attractive 
prospect is available and an economically adequate return seems feasi-
ble (after adjustment for political risk). 
Exploration declined in the United States after the mid 1950's be-
cause: (a) there was excess oil producing capacity; (b) many of the most 
attractive prospects were held off the market by the Government (e.g., 
the Atlantic offshore); (c) environmental objections blocked promising 
developments (e.g., the Alaskan North Slope); and ( d) crude oil and 
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natural gas price ceilings cast an economic cloud over the industry. 
2. Gives international companies a competitive advantage over do-
mestic competitors by enabling them to apply unused foreign tax cred-
its against their tax liabilities on domestic source income. 
This allegation is simply false. Unused foreign tax credits cannot 
be used to reduce tax on U.S.-source income because the amount of 
foreign tax which can be credited is limited to the amount of U.S. tax 
which would be due on the foreign operation if it were conducted in the 
United States. A foreign loss may be deductible from U.S. income, but 
unused foreign tax credits do not reduce taxes on domestic-source in-
come. 
3. Permits U.S. petroleum taxpayers to escape U.S. tax by enabling 
them to credit royalties and/or to transfer unused credits to shelter 
income from low-tax foreign countries or industries which would other-
wise be taxable to the United States. 
It is on these two points that I wish to concentrate today, since 
recent actions of the Committee on Ways and Means are designed to 
"correct" them. 
I. PRODUCING COUNTRY INCOME TAXES ALLEGEDLY ARE 
EITHER ROYALTIES OR EXCISE TAXES, IN WHOLE OR IN 
PART 
In Saudi Arabia, Aramco's concessionary arrangements provide 
that the government is to receive a basic royalty equal to four gold 
shillings per ton (plus another five cents per barrel for offshore produc-
tion). Converted at $35 an ounce, this basic royalty of four gold shillings 
was $.22 for light Arabian oil of 34° no gravity. Most of the concessions 
in other producing countries generally provide that the royalty be 1/s of 
the market value of oil, on which posted prices were based until the late 
1950's. 
In 1950, Saudi Arabia also levied an income tax after observing that 
Venezuela and many other countries were imposing income taxes on 
profits of the companies operating in their jurisdictions. Saudi Arabia 
levied a 20 percent income tax and also an additional income tax of 50 
percent with the 20 percent income tax and the above royalties being 
credits against the 50 percent additional income tax. In other words, the 
sum of the royalties, the 20 percent income tax, and the additional 
income tax were to equal 50 percent of the profits before royalties and 
taxes. Since the income tax and the additional income tax were mea-
sured by, and levied on, income in the same manner that the U.S. tax 
law levies a tax on income, the new taxes were accepted by the U.S. 
Treasury as a creditable income tax. That treatment by the Treasury 
was no different from its treatment of income taxes in other foreign 
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countries-such as Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia 
-where American companies produce oil. 
Accordingly, since 1950, Aramco has paid both taxes based on its 
income and a royalty to the Saudi Arabian government. Yet for a 
quarter of a century, critics of the oil industry have persistently claimed 
that the whole arrangement in 1950 was an effort to convert a royalty 
into a tax. They make this contention even though the basic royalty was 
continued and is still paid in addition to the tax. In fact, the royalty is 
higher today. In addition to the basic royalty discussed above, Aramco 
is required to make a supplemental royalty payment so that the total 
royalty payments are never less than 1/s of the posted price, even though 
the posted price has usually exceeded market price since the late 1950's. 
The argument that the entire payment is a royalty is without merit 
because it implicitly denies a sovereign government the right to levy an 
income tax in addition to a royalty on oil production in its jurisdiction. 
A foreign government deals with the oil industry in two capacities: 
(a) as the owner of natural resources in place; and (b) as a sovereign 
taxing power. The foreign government collects a royalty as the owner of 
the natural resources; and it levies an income tax on the profits in its 
capacity as the taxing sovereign. Each payment is separate, and each 
is made for different reasons. In recognition of this distinction, a U.S. 
tax deduction is allowed for the royalty; and a U.S. tax credit is allowed 
for the income tax to the extent that the United States would tax the 
same income. Thus, a tax credit is not allowed for oil royalties paid to 
foreign governments. This system of payments is used in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Venezuela, and the Persian Gulf. It paral-
lels payments to the U.S. Government on its own oil lands. The U.S. 
Government collects a royalty as the landowner and levies an income 
tax on the profits as the taxing sovereign. There is no reason to treat 
payments to foreign governments differently. 
A variant of the royalty argument states that the income tax is 
actually an excise tax. By definition, an income tax varies with changes 
in profits and hence, with changes in market price or cost. However, 
under the posted price system as we have known it for the past 15 years 
or so, posted price has exceeded market price; and at a given level of 
posted price, the income of a company based on posted prices has not 
changed even though income based on market prices has varied with 
fluctuations in market price. Thus, some critics assert that the tax is 
actually a specific excise tax of so many dollars per barrel. This conten-
tion is highly questionable. 
In the first place, the tax usually applies to the difference between 
the posted price (or the market price if that happens to be higher than 
post) and actual costs before income tax. Consequently, when costs 
change, the per barrel tax changes accordingly. Moreover, since costs 
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vary among companies and fields, the tax is not the same on different 
companies or on oil from different fields. Do excise taxes differ among 
companies when the companies' costs differ? That is a characteristic of 
income taxes, not of excise taxes. Some might contend that this defense 
is de minim is because actual cost is only a small fraction of posted price. 
But even that is not necessarily true outside of the Middle East. 
More importantly, the argument has two further flaws. 
A. A Point of Law 
The crude is sometimes exported from the countries at the posted 
prices in order to meet concessionary requirements. These requirements 
are a condition of retaining the concession and are not a part of the tax 
law. Thus, no other price could legally be used as the sales price of a 
company subject to the concessionary requirements-regardless of what 
the tax rate may be under the tax law. In such a case, the company has 
realized income based on posted price; and this is the actual income of 
that company as the term "income" is generally understood in commer-
cial and business affairs or in its use in the sixteenth amendment of the 
United States Constitution and the U.S. tax laws. Thus, any tax based 
on posted price is an income tax for that company and should be recog-
nized as an income tax for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes. It is our view 
that where the taxes are based on the actual income of a company 
subject to those tax laws, the tax payments are an income tax even 
though that income may be inflated because the company is required 
to export oil at the posted prices. 
B. A Point of Economics and Sovereignty 
What if the tax were levied on the difference between realized mar-
ket price and cost without a posted price computation? How could it be 
considered anything other than an income tax on the pron ts of the firm? 
Any other position would implicitly question the right of a producing 
country to levy an income tax. But the United States can surely not 
deny the right of a sovereign foreign government to tax corporate profits. 
Entirely apart from considerations of local law, at least that part of the 
tax attributable to the difference between realized price and cost must 
be an income tax. As Mr. Stanford Ross recently told the Church Sub-
committee: 
Oil companies as well as manufacturing and other multinational com-
panies should expect to pay some reasonable amount of income taxes 
to host or source countries, and, in fairness, only a part of what is paid 
to Middle Eastern countries could equitably be treated as a royalty .1 
1. Statement of Stanford G. Ross, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational 
Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 
126 (1973). 
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At least part of the payment to governments must be a tax. And we 
believe that the tax on the difference between market price and cost is 
clearly an income tax. One may argue that the law should be amended 
so that the remaining tax which is attributable to the difference between 
posted price and market price is a non-creditable tax; but the tax on 
the difference between market price and cost is an income tax which 
should be creditable. 
An equitable way to resolve this controversy over income tax versus 
royalty versus excise tax could be simply to disallow as an income tax 
creditable for U.S. tax purposes the tax on the difference between posted 
price and market price, as the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue Taxation has recently suggested. (This would parallel the 
treatment of foreign percentage depletion, which is effectively disal-
lowed for the purpose of computing transferable credits.) 
One final note on this matter. Some circles in the producing coun-
tries have recently contended that the oil companies should be held to 
a constant after-tax profit per barrel of sales. This would imply back-
calculating the posted price from the difference between market price 
and cost to give a company the stipulated profit. If such a system is 
adopted, the posted price must change when market price changes. 
Thus, the tax would clearly be a function of market price because the 
tax would follow from posted price which, in turn, would change with 
market price. Another way to look at it is to consider the extra tax a sort 
of 100 percent excess profits tax. If market price were to rise, posted 
price would be recalculated to capture the entire increase for the produc-
ing government-that differs only in the mrginal rate (100% versus 85%) 
from the U.S. Korean War excess profits tax. 
II. TRANSFERRING UNUSED CREDITS SHELTERS INCOME 
WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE TAXABLE TO THE UNITED 
STATES 
The U.S. tax potentially due on income from the producing coun-
tries is usually less than the foreign tax, leaving the taxpayer with un-
used credits. Taxpayers electing the overall limitation on the foreign tax 
credit can use these unused credits from the producing countries if they 
operate in other countries which have tax rates lower than the U.S. rate. 
Thus, the overall limitation method is criticized because it allegedly 
shelters income earned by American firms in low-tax countries or indus-
tries abroad from home taxation. The unused credits from a high-tax 
country can be used to offset the difference between the tax rate in the 
low-tax foreign country and the tax rate at home. A moment's careful 
reflection will show, we believe, that this claim is largely invalid. 
For the criticism to be valid, a basic condition must prevail: 
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Only American companies must be willing to make the investment in 
the low-tax country or industry. 
This is most unlikely in view of the economic growth of Europe and 
Japan over the past twenty years. Imposing a U.S. tax on American 
companies does not mean that active foreign-owned competitors-now 
including the Japanese and the oil producing countries, as well as the 
Europeans-will be taxed by their home governments. Market forces 
require parallel tax treatment of American foreign investment if the 
American producer is to remain competitive with foreign-owned compa-
nies. 
Our principal foreign-owned competitors are domiciled in the Neth-
erlands, the United Kingdom, and France. The Netherlands and France 
do not tax foreign-source income, and the United Kingdom permits an 
averaging of foreign losses and profits similar to the U.S. overall limita-
tion method. Disallowance of the transferral of unused credits from 
high-tax countries in the integrated chain of operations to cover low-tax 
countries would leave us at a serious competitive disadvantage relative 
to companies domiciled in countries which either do not tax foreign-
source income at all, or tax it on some sort of global basis which aggre-
gates all foreign profits, losses, and taxes. Thus, one cannot really say 
that the transfer of unused credits shelters income which would other-
wise be subject to U.S. tax. On the contrary, without the transfer, there 
would very likely be no U.S. company operating in the low-tax environ-
ment. 
Of particular importance in this connection is our international 
tanker fleet. World shipping is characterized by tax incentives-to be 
blunt, by virtual exemption from tax. If American oil companies are 
taxed on their foreign shipping income, the shipping component of the 
delivered cost of their refined products would be higher than that in-
curred by their foreign competitors. Thus, American companies could 
no longer afford to build tankers for international service rather than 
charter them from foreign companies. This cannot be in the national 
interest. 
In his Trade Message on April 10, 1973, the President said: 
. . . our system for taxing the foreign profits of American business . . 
permits American-controlled business in foreign countries to operate 
under the same tax burdens which apply to its foreign competitors in 
that country. I believe that system is fundamentally sound. We should 
not penalize American business by placing it at a disadvantage with 
respect to its foreign competitors. 
This view is economically sound. Any other treatment would jeopardize 
the competitive survival of American oil companies abroad. We cannot 
accept that as being in the national interest. 
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III. THE NEW ENERGY TAXATION BILL 
I should like to close by discussing what the Committee on Ways 
and Means proposes to do about the royalty-excise and transferral issues 
in its new "Oil and Gas Energy Tax Act of 1974." After much delibera-
tion and many suggestions the Committee has come up with a rather 
simple change. First, all oil companies would be put on the overall basis. 
Today, the overall basis lumps together all foreign income and taxes and 
permits a maximum U.S. credit of 48 percent of foreign source in-
come-assuming, of course, that that much total income tax has been 
paid somewhere abroad: 
DIAGRAM A 
All Foreign Income 
Aggregated 
Second, Ways and Means would fracture our foreign business into 
"oil" and "other:" 
DIAGRAM B 
----48%----
-48%-
0il Other 
A second 48 percent credit limit would be applied to oil-related income. 
This is discriminatory treatment of oil income (no other business is so 
treated). Its effect is to prevent the transfer of credits from oil-related 
income to non-oil income. We were surprised to find that interest on our 
loans to our petroleum affiliates is not considered oil income. 
Third, a second fracturing would isolate income from the extractive 
stage of the oil business and limit the creditable tax to 10 percent more 
than the statutory rate (or 52.8 percent) applied to income based on 
market price, not posted price: 
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DIAGRAM C 
-----48%------
-48%- Other 
Oil 
Extractive 
-52.8%-
Unused credits from extraction could only be applied to oil income, not 
to other. 
This treatment is doubly discriminatory in comparison with other 
industries: 
1. It disallows part of the foreign tax, even in countries where compa-
nies are required by law to sell at the posted price. 
2. It substitutes a 52.8 percent tax rate for the rate actually imposed 
by the foreign country. 
As indicated earlier, we can understand an argument for disallowing 
that part of the tax attributable to the difference between market price 
and posted price. But why disallow part of the foreign tax actually paid? 
Even if there were no posted price computation, this provision would 
substitute the U.S. rate plus 10 percent for the foreign rate; that is also 
treatment not accorded any other industry. 
The Administration has proposed using the U.S. rate of 48 percent 
as the limit on extractive income. That proposal lost in the Committee 
by only one vote with two members not voting. 
Encouragingly, both the Committee and the Administration ver-
sions accept the view that part of the producing tax is, in fact, an income 
tax. That is certainly far preferable to contending that the whole tax is 
a royalty or excise tax. 
Discouragingly, however, both versions sharply restrict the amount 
of transferable credit from oil production. The Committee version re-
stricts credit to 4.8 percent of income based on market price (52.8-48). 
The Administration version would restrict to zero. Our foreign competi-
tors face no such restrictions from their home governments. 
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